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LAW CLERKS AS ADVISORS:  
A LOOK AT THE BLACKMUN PAPERS 
ZACHARY WALLANDER 
SARA C. BENESH** 
The Justices of the United States Supreme Court seek advice, by way 
of cert pool memos, when making their consequential agenda-setting 
decisions.  There is some debate over the extent to which these law clerks 
actually influence the Justices.  Focusing on the certiorari stage and on the 
information and advice provided to the Court via the cert pool memos, we 
ascertain the extent to which the contents of the memos drive the decision 
making of the Court.  We find that information about conflict, amici, and 
the position of the United States does indeed influence the Court’s votes, 
but also that the clerks’ specific advice, the apparent percolation of the 
issue, and the perceptions of the strength of the reasoning below matters 
as well.  We conclude with some thoughts on the findings and directions 
for future research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The articles in this symposium all concern themselves with the role 
of the judicial law clerk, and given that this symposium is the first of its 
kind and law clerks have been around for a very long time, it is clear 
that this attention is long overdue.  In this Article, we focus on the 
potential influence law clerks as advisors may have on the Justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court by attempting to trace the extent to which the 
memoranda clerks draft for their Justices regarding petitions for 
certiorari are influential to the Justices’ decision making, both in their 
recommendation as to cert and in the information they contain. 
We begin our discussion with the evolution of the institution of the 
law clerk and continue with a discussion of the various duties Supreme 
Court law clerks undertake and of how they are selected for the job.  
Focusing on the cert pool, we discuss the stage at which the influence of 
law clerks is plausibly at its apex, detailing the memoranda drafted and 
their contents and outlining their potential influence on the decisions 
made by the Justices in setting their agenda.  Considering the law clerks 
to be advisors, not unlike the advisors used by other elites and by people 
in their everyday lives, we attempt to ascertain whether the advice of the 
law clerks matters by considering a model of cert decisions that includes 
the advice of the law clerk (and controls for all other known 
determinants of the cert vote).  We also consider the actual information 
the advisors provide, ascertaining whether the presence of said 
information influences the decisions on cert as well.  We end with some 
directions for further research and some thoughts on the role of the law 
clerk uncovered by our analysis. 
II. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 
Established in Article III of the United States Constitution in 1789, 
the Supreme Court of the United States is the highest federal court in 
the land.1  Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress provided for a 
Supreme Court that consisted of six Justices:  a Chief Justice, and five 
 
1.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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Associate Justices.2  That number was increased to nine in 1869,3 with 
eight Associate Justices and one Chief Justice, who presides over 
impeachment cases in the Senate, is the spokesperson for the Judicial 
Branch in public and before Congress, and manages the Court’s public 
sessions and oral arguments.4  Since the Court’s inception, the primary 
role of the Supreme Court has been as an appellate court, hearing 
appeals from lower state and federal court decisions to ascertain 
whether the law has been applied correctly and whether appropriate 
procedures were followed. 
Early in the Court’s history, the Justices met the demands of appeals 
on their own, given that the Court’s attention was not often sought.5  
However, with the expansion of the United States and the purchase of 
new territory, as well as an increase in the types of cases the Court could 
hear, it became evident that the Court needed help.6  Congress created a 
system of federal circuit courts to serve as an intermediate appellate 
court, alleviating some of the increasing demands on the Justices.7  
However, this solution proved to be insufficient, as the Court began to 
fall behind yet again.8  This time Congress responded to the Justices’ 
pleas by passing the Certiorari Act of 1925,9 which allowed the Court 
greater control over its docket by decreasing automatic appeals and by 
granting the Court the power to determine whether cases were worthy 
of its time.10  Under the Act, most requests for the Court’s attention 
would be made via a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Court 
 
2.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73. 
3.  Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44. 
4.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; ELDER WITT, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 753 (2d 
ed. 1990) (citing JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
LIFE 70–71 (1958)). 
5.  WILLIAM REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 8–9 (new ed., Alfred A. Knopf 2001) 
(1987). 
6.  Id. at 9. 
7.  Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, §§ 2, 6, 26 Stat. 826, 826, 828. 
8.  REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 9. 
9.  Certiorari Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
10.  Id.  This is, of course, a major grant of power as well.  Indeed, one of the leading 
explanations for Supreme Court decisions, the attitudinal model, explicitly credits the level of 
docket control afforded to the Court to be a prerequisite to ideologically based decision 
making.  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 93 (2002).  By gaining so much control over the cases it 
hears, the Court can necessarily focus on those cases with the strongest public policy 
implications, which are, by their nature, less legally clear and more ideologically disputed.  
See id. 
 46 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:43 
would be empowered to accept or deny the cases brought to it, largely as 
it saw fit.11 
III. CREATION OF LAW CLERKS 
Of course, as the country modernized and more laws were written 
and more lawsuits were brought, and as the Court became a more 
powerful player in American politics, more and more litigants sought 
the Court’s attention.12  The Justices started to receive many more 
petitions than they could plausibly hear, and deciding which cases to 
decide became a major part of their job and a substantial use of their 
time.13  To assist in this winnowing process, an institution evolved: the 
law clerk. 
An overburdened Court requested that Congress hire clerks, but 
Congress did not, at first, oblige, so many of the Justices turned to 
current employees already working at the Supreme Court to assist with 
clerk-like duties.14  In 1882, Justice Horace Gray, on his own and using 
his own money, hired the first law clerk of the Supreme Court to assist 
him with his work.15  The success of that first law clerk convinced 
Congress to hire and pay law clerks to assist all of the Justices.16  At first, 
clerks were utilized like secretaries, charged with copying opinions and 
typing what their Justice requested.17  Clerks investigated case law,18 but 
their role was largely to learn the law and to type exactly what they were 
told.19 
By 1919, the clerk moved from a secretarial role to that of a research 
assistant.20  Clerks were no longer solely investigating case law and 
typing opinions for their Justice.21  Instead, during this regime, the 
Justices wrote initial drafts of opinions and law clerks served as editors, 
 
11.  REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 9. 
12.  See ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 
YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 25 (2006). 
13.  TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 41 (2006). 
14.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 24. 
15.  Id.  
16.  Id.; see Sundry Civil Act of 1886, ch. 902, 24 Stat. 222, 253. 
17.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 34. 
18.  WITT, supra note 4, at 769. 
19.  See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 34. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. at 35. 
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ensuring appropriate citations were used and inserting relevant 
footnotes.22  Because of this editing role, clerks became more involved 
in research and frequently contributed to the Justices’ written work 
product.23  When a Justice needed additional information, he would turn 
to clerks to conduct research and find sources to support his 
arguments.24 
By 1942, according to Ward and Weiden, the role of clerks shifted 
again, so much so that they consider clerks from this time forward to be 
“junior justices.”25  The number of clerks doubled, with each Justice now 
employing two law clerks instead of one.26  As a junior justice, clerks 
were active decision makers expected to review and analyze cert 
petitions, to make recommendations as to whether cert ought to be 
granted, and to draft opinions for their Justice, switching from the role 
of editor to that of first drafter.27  Making this more substantive use of 
the law clerks, Justices could keep up with their increasing workload and 
no Justice, even those who were among the slowest of writers, would fall 
behind.28 
In 1970, Congress allowed each Justice to hire two additional clerks, 
giving each Justice a total of four law clerks, and the institution of the 
law clerk was transformed yet again.29  Clerks became even more 
involved in opinion-writing, given that the availability of additional 
clerks meant less clerk time was spent reviewing cert petitions.30  
Obviously, this delegation provides a venue for clerks to assume 
influence and possibly shape public policy, given that the Supreme 
Court’s opinions communicate the legal policy they make.31  On 
occasion, opinions for cases drafted by law clerks have been released 
under the Justice’s name, with no major revision.32  This apparent 
 
22.  See id.  
23.  See id. 
24.  See id. 
25.  See id. at 200. 
26.  Id. at 36. 
27.  See id. at 36–41. 
28.  See id. at 39. 
29.  Id. at 45. 
30.  Id. 
31.  See Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Lee Sigelman, Ghostwriters on the 
Court? A Stylistic Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 
167 (2002). 
32.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 241. 
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increase in power33 meant that clerkships became more and more 
attractive and the Justices could be more and more discriminating in 
their hiring decisions, making the selection of these ever-more-involved 
actors more and more important.34 
Other articles in this symposium address clerk selection,35 but a few 
things are particularly important to our consideration of law clerks as 
advisors, so we consider the aspects of the selection process bearing on 
the degree to which Justices will rely on their law clerk advisors. 
IV. SELECTION OF CLERKS  
We know that each Justice chooses four law clerks to work in his or 
her chambers to assist with opinion writing, determine the cert-iness of 
petitions, or perform other clerical duties and that each Justice has his 
or her own system for choosing these clerks.36  However, the 
attractiveness of the Supreme Court clerkship means that the Justices 
can be very choosy, focusing only on the “best of the best.”37  Hence, 
Supreme Court clerks tend to hail from prestigious law schools with 
 
33.  Id. at 241–42.  For some time, scholars have been interested in whether law clerks, 
who work for the Justices, influence the Court’s decision making.  EDWARD LAZARUS, 
CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 
271–72 (2005); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE 
SUPREME COURT 34, 241 (1979); Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, The Role of Law 
Clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 40 AM. POL. RES. 147, 164 (2012); 
Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Research Note, Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization 
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POLITICS. 869, 870 (2001); Todd C. Peppers & Christopher 
Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 
DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 53 (2008); Wahlbeck et al., supra note 31, at 167; William H. Rehnquist, 
Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 
74, 75.  The image of clerks influencing the outcome of a Justice’s decision, and ultimately the 
outcome of a case, is seen by some as inappropriate and unwarranted.  LAZARUS, supra, at 
271–72.  Lazarus suggests that at least some Justices willingly ceded power to ideologically 
motivated clerks, with profound consequences.  See id. at 274.  Of course, this argument is 
made by a former clerk with potentially exaggerated notions of his own influence, and he 
does not provide empirical evidence to demonstrate his claims. 
34.  See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 57. 
35.  See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Court Law Clerks: Probing the 
Ideological Linkage Between Judges and Justices, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 333, 340 (2014); 
Christopher D. Kromphardt, Fielding an Excellent Team: Law Clerk Selection and Chambers 
Structure at the U.S. Supreme Court, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 289, 291–98 (2014); Aaron L. Nielson, 
The Future of Federal Law Clerk Hiring, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 181, 190 (2014); John J. Szmer, 
Erin B. Kaheny & Robert K. Christensen, Taking a Dip in the Supreme Court Clerk Pool: 
Gender-Biased Discrepancies in Clerk Selection, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 261, 263–66 (2014). 
36.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 45, 108. 
37.  See id. at 70–71. 
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impressive pedigrees and have experience on law reviews as well as 
experience clerking with a lower court judge (many of whom feed their 
clerks up to specific Supreme Court Justices, which we discuss in detail 
shortly).38  Many of the first clerks to work for the Justices came from 
Harvard, and that tradition continues, as most law clerks now hail from 
Harvard or Yale.39  If one considers law school pedigree as a proxy for 
“quality,” then it may be the case that clerks will be differentially 
influential, depending on the law school they attended.  Of course, given 
that so many attend the most prestigious law schools, there will likely be 
little variation in quality; all of them will likely be of superior quality. 
Becoming perhaps even more important than pedigree, though, is 
experience clerking for a lower court judge, and that experience has 
ideological as well as qualifications implications for the clerk-as-advisor.  
Today, it is almost always the case that a Supreme Court clerk has first 
clerked for a lower court judge; indeed, “securing a clerkship on the 
courts of appeals with one of the top ‘feeder’ judges has become a 
virtual requirement” for any candidate to clerk at the Supreme Court.40  
“Feeder judges” are those lower court judges who consistently place 
clerks on the Court due to the relationship they have forged with 
specific Justices.41  Given the increase in applications, the Justices need 
help choosing good clerks, and one major requirement that appears to 
be quite important to most of the Justices is ideological congruence.42  
Indeed, Ward and Weiden find “a remarkable ideological congruence 
between justices and clerks” such that liberal clerks generally work for 
liberal Justices and vice versa.43  Given that we know that, in general, 
people are more receptive to advice with which they agree,44 this 
suggests that the Justices will be most attentive to their own clerks and 
the clerks for the Justices with whom they most frequently agree.  And 
given that these feeder judges are consistently providing the Justices 
with quality, ideologically congruent clerks, the opinions of these feeder 
 
38.  Id. at 68–69, 239. 
39.  Id. at 70–75. 
40.  Id. at 107. 
41.  Id. at 68–69, 75, 80–83. 
42.  Id. at 83. 
43.  Id. at 55; see also Christopher D. Kromphardt, supra note 35, at 295, 297. 
44.  See, e.g., Michael H. Birnbaum & Steven E. Stegner, Source Credibility in Social 
Judgment: Bias, Expertise, and the Judge’s Point of View, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 48, 48–49 (1979). 
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judges may also affect the way in which the Justices view the decision 
made below, which will be explored further below. 
Given this information on selection, we might consider clerk advice 
to be quite influential, given that clerks are quality sources who tend to 
agree with the Justices for whom they work.  In addition, we might 
expect some pieces of information about cases petitioned to the Court 
to be particularly useful to the Justices in amassing their docket.  
Indeed, the cert decision, becoming more and more difficult as petitions 
become more and more numerous,45 is just the place to consider the role 
of clerks as advisors.  The clerks themselves single out the cert stage as 
the stage at which their input is most influential.46  In the next section, 
we detail the certiorari process and the role clerks play in it.  We then 
examine the political science literature on certiorari to date and attempt 
to ascertain whether, in addition to the known determinants of cert, the 
recommendations of the clerks (the Justices’ advisors) also matter and 
whether the information they provide to the Justices, via the cert pool 
memos, contributes to Supreme Court decision making on cert. 
V. THE CERT POOL 
One of the most influential institutional design changes in 
considering the role of the law clerk at the U.S. Supreme Court was the 
creation of the “cert pool.”47  The cert pool, like the institution of law 
clerks itself, was designed to reduce the workload of the Justices by 
combining efforts while also improving decision making and by 
providing edited, reliable information about the cases requesting 
Supreme Court review.48  Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., who suggested the 
cert pool in 1972, thought the institution would reduce duplication of 
effort.49  “Rather than have nine clerk-written memos on each case, the 
pool of clerks would divide up all the petitions and produce only one 
memo on each case for all the justices who chose to participate.”50  This 
also, however, provided an opportunity for the clerks to influence the 
decision making of the Justices.  As more petitions were filed, the clerks’ 
recommendations arguably became even more important.  Via the cert 
 
45.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 109, 125. 
46.  Id. at 146–47. 
47.  Id. at 147. 
48.  See id. at 45. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
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pool memos, clerks provide the Justices with vast amounts of edited 
information necessary for decision making.51  The clerks, then, have the 
opportunity to act as advisors to the Justices, and the advice they 
provide—the carefully edited case information in the cert pool 
memos—can guide judicial decision making.  Indeed, the primary 
source of information used by the Justices to make cert decisions, and 
the customary way law clerks communicate advice and information to 
the Justices, is via the cert pool memorandum.52  Drafting pool memos 
at the cert stage means law clerks are “the initial gatekeepers and 
primary decision makers in the agenda-setting process.”53  The creation 
of the dead list under Chief Justice Hughes signaled that not all cases 
were worthy of discussion, and pool memos became an even more 
important means of learning about the cases being petitioned.54 
The cert pool and greater reliance on pool memos also meant clerks 
would have more time to devote to each cert pool memo, allowing for a 
more thorough and in-depth analysis of the case and greater 
interpretation of the law or issue at stake.55  Although the creation of 
the cert pool may have diluted individual clerk influence by giving each 
clerk fewer cases to analyze, the influence of the clerks as a whole 
potentially expanded at the very important agenda-setting stage.56 
The cert pool memoranda, produced by the law clerks for all of the 
Justices in the cert pool, are typed assessments that include information 
and summary as well as analysis by the clerk, and only recently were 
they made systematically available to scholars.57  The cert pool 
 
51.  Id. at 125–126. 
52.  See id. at 126. 
53.  Id. at 238. 
54.  Id. at 113, 126. 
55.  See id. at 120–123, 142. 
56.  Id. at 147, 238. 
57.  H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 42 (1991).  Justices have included some cert pool memos in their 
papers.  For example, one can obtain copies of memos for granted cases from Justice Powell’s 
archives at Washington and Lee University Law School.  Justice Powell had the memos in 
cases denied cert destroyed, according to John N. Jacob, the Archivist of his papers.  E-mail 
from John N. Jacob, Archivist and Special Collections Law Librarian, Wash. & Lee Sch. of 
Law, to Sara C. Benesh, Assoc. Professor of Political Sci., Univ. of Wisconsin–Milwaukee 
(Apr. 23, 2014, 09:10 CST) (on file with author).  However, Justice Harry Blackmun included 
nearly all of the memos, both in cases granted and in cases denied cert, during the 1986–1993 
Terms.  LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE DIGITAL ARCHIVE 
OF THE PAPERS OF JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN (2007), http://epstein.wustl.edu/blackmu
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memoranda are stylistically uniform, regardless of author, beginning on 
the first page with the names of the parties, the lower court that made 
the most recent decision on the case, and a categorization of the case as 
Federal/Civil, State/Civil, Federal/Criminal, State/Criminal, Federal/ 
Habeas, State/Habeas, or Military/Criminal.  Next, the law clerk author 
provides the following sections: (1) a summary of the case; (2) the facts 
and proceedings below; (3) the contentions made by the petitioner and 
the respondent; (4) the clerk’s evaluation of the case; and (5) the 
recommendation by the clerk of what action should be taken (usually 
deny, grant, or Call for Record (CFR) with a possibility to grant).  The 
Appendix provides screen shots of these memoranda, illustrating these 
sections and the language used, as well as the markup done by Justice 
Blackmun’s clerks.58 
VI. CLERKS AS ADVISORS—INFLUENCE VIA ADVICE 
The cert pool memos, all of which end with an explicit 
recommendation by the memo clerk author,59 should carry a significant 
amount of influence.  As noted above, the clerks themselves suggest that 
the decision to grant or deny cert is where law clerks have the most 
influence on judicial decision making,60 and given the large numbers of 
cases that request the Court’s attention, it seems nearly impossible for 
the Justices to conduct independent reviews of all petitions.  According 
to our data, when the pool memo clerk recommends that the Justices 
grant cert to a petition on certiorari, the Court grants cert approximately 
 
n.php, archived at http://perma.cc/S5MQ-TPA9.  These memos also include the penciled 
“mark up” he had the clerks in his chambers provide.  See, e.g., infra Appendix. 
58.  See infra Appendix.  Of course, not every Justice was a member of the cert pool.  
See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 119.  During the 1986–1993 Terms, considered here, 
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens declined to join the pool.  See PERRY, supra note 57, 
at 42.  There is some dispute over whether non-cert pool chambers also receive the cert pool 
memo, but it appears to be the case that they do not.  Zachary Wallander, SCOTUS on Cert: 
A Look at the Blackmun Papers 63–64 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin–Milwaukee) (on file with author).  This complicates our analysis, given that we 
focus on cert decisions of the Court as a whole, but given that it is a small minority of Justices 
who likely did not see the memos and given that they do not, themselves, comprise enough 
votes to grant, some Justice in the group voting to grant cert in any given case would have 
relied upon the cert pool memo.  It is interesting to note, however, that in an individual-
analysis of the Justice votes, Wallander finds that Justice Blackmun was influenced by the cert 
pool memo’s recommendation while Justice Stevens (not in the pool) was not.  Wallander, 
supra, at 68–69. 
59.  PERRY, supra note 57, at 42. 
60.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 146–47.  
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92% of the time, and when the clerk recommends a denial, the Court 
heeds that advice 76% of the time.61 
It may well be that the memo itself, even independent from the final 
recommendation by the clerk, is slanted in such a way as to convince the 
Chief Justices to view the petition as either worthy or not worthy.  
Lazarus and Justice Rehnquist argue that such slanting may well occur.62  
However, many of the pool Justices had their own clerks reread the 
memos to make sure the argument and reasoning were not biased and 
that the assessment of the case was fair.63  The mark-up of the pool 
memo by a Justice’s own clerk ensures that the brief offers a fair 
presentation of the arguments for and against hearing the case.64 
Note well, though, that while Lazarus and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
view any influence of clerk recommendation on cert decision to be 
somehow problematic,65 we see this as a normal relationship between a 
decision maker and his or her advisor.  Decision making in complex 
situations often involves the seeking out of and consideration of advice, 
whether it is a patient attempting to make a decision regarding medical 
treatment, a potential litigant considering filing a lawsuit, a taxpayer 
seeking to comply with the U.S. Tax Code, or a student determining 
which courses to take in the fall.  All of these individuals consult 
 
61.  Interestingly, when the cert pool was created, pool clerks were instructed to draft 
pool memos with no explicit recommendation about whether the petition should be granted 
or denied cert.  Id. at 124.  However, in practice, even early on in the institution’s history, the 
clerks made mention of their take on the cert petition.  Id.  Justice Powell clearly wanted 
clerks to provide an explicit recommendation, and eventually, it became part of the rubric for 
the memos.  Id.  It certainly appears to be the case, then, that the Justices were seeking clerks’ 
advice from the start. 
62.  LAZARUS, supra note 33, at 262–63; Rehnquist, supra note 33, at 75. 
63.  See PEPPERS, supra note 13, at 164–65; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 125; 
Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom:  The ‘Cert. Pool,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A21. 
64.  See PERRY, supra note 57, at 42.  The Blackmun Papers allow us to see the mark-up 
Justice Blackmun required of his own clerks in screening the memo author’s assessment of 
the petition.  See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 57.  Routinely, his clerks highlighted the names 
of lower court judges, the lower court for which the judge worked, whether the Solicitor 
General or amicus provided an argument in the petition, whether they deemed the alleged 
conflict as real, and any corrections to the memo author’s interpretation of the case.  Id.  At 
the end of each pool memo, Justice Blackmun’s clerks provided the memo author’s first name 
(the last name is always typed on the memo), the Justice for whom she clerked, the lower 
court judge for whom she clerked, and the law school she attended, as well as Justice 
Blackmun’s clerk’s own recommendation on cert and a reason for any disagreement with the 
pool clerk’s recommendation written in paragraph form.  Id.  A sample is shown in the 
Appendix.  The two clerks agreed 86% of the time, according to our data. 
65.  Rehnquist, supra note 33, at 75; LAZARUS, supra note 33, at 267, 272–274. 
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experts, and their eventual decisions reflect some combination of their 
own preferences and information and the advice they receive.  The 
degree to which they rely on that advice is likely to hinge on the degree 
to which they trust the advisor, which in turn depends on whether the 
decision maker ascribes to the advisor an adequate level of expertise 
and like-mindedness.  Indeed, people tend to weigh their own opinion 
much more heavily than they weigh others’, and the further the advice is 
from their own perception of the issue, the less likely they are to follow 
it, especially when they are, themselves, knowledgeable.66  The advice is 
also evaluated, at least in part, with references to the advisor,67 and even 
the most knowledgeable use heuristics to make complex decisions, some 
of which include their perceptions of the source of advice68 and the 
source’s credibility.69  Overall, decisions made taking advice into 
account are qualitatively better than those made without such advice.70  
Those better decisions are also much more efficiently made, and 
efficiency, to the Justices at cert, is surely a much sought-after goal.  
It is reasonable to assume, given the experimental psychology 
literature cited above and the quality of law clerks and their ideological 
congruence with the Justices, that Supreme Court Justices will also be 
influenced by the advice available to them (most important to us, advice 
given to them by their law clerks via the cert pool memos) and that 
reliance is, rather than a negative influence to be avoided, a positive 
improvement to the Court’s certiorari decisions. 
In order to test our theory of advice, we focus, as noted, on the stage 
at which we view the potential to influence decision making to be at its 
apex: the certiorari decision.  We first consider what we know about the 
 
66.  Birnbaum & Stegner, supra note 44, at 48; Robert Huckfeldt, The Social 
Communication of Political Expertise, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 425, 426 (2001); Ilan Yaniv, 
Receiving Other People’s Advice: Influence and Benefit, 93 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 1, 2 (2004) [hereinafter Yaniv, Receiving Other People’s Advice]; Ilan Yaniv, The 
Benefit of Additional Opinions, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 75, 76 (2004). 
67.  See, e.g., Birnbaum & Stegner, supra note 44, at 48–49; Huckfeldt, supra note 66, 
at 437. 
68.  Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of 
Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752, 763 
(1980). 
69.  Jeffery J. Mondak, Perceived Legitimacy of Supreme Court Decisions: Three 
Functions of Source Credibility, 12 POL. BEHAV. 363, 365 (1990); Jeffery J. Mondak, Source 
Cues and Policy Approval: The Cognitive Dynamics of Public Support for the Reagan Agenda, 
37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186, 188, 190 (1993). 
70.  Yaniv, Receiving Other People’s Advice, supra note 66, at 3.  See generally, Chaiken, 
supra note 68. 
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cert decision, control for all of those things, and then ascertain whether 
and to what degree the clerk’s recommendation and the information 
provided by the clerk to the Justices in the cert pool memo further 
influences the decision making of the Court. 
VII.  A MODEL OF CERTIORARI DECISIONS 
There is a tremendous amount of literature in political science on 
the determinants of cert, and while some of the analyses suffer from 
selection bias (e.g., they study only those cases actually granted cert) the 
best of them consider both cert grants and cert denials.  To date, 
Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn test one of the most thorough models of 
cert, including nearly all of the variables that prior research deemed 
important to the Court’s cert decisions.71  These variables include 
dissensus in the lower courts (e.g., dissents or concurrences issued by the 
lower court), issue areas involving civil liberties, and the support of the 
federal government, all of which serve as indicators, or “cues,” about the 
certworthiness of a case.72  Strategy has also been proffered as a reason 
why the Justices make decisions on cert as they attempt to obtain their 
most favored outcome on the merits, achieved sometimes by voting to 
deny a case to avoid a loss on the merits.73 
Additionally, constitutional claims made by the parties have been 
found to increase the likelihood of cert, while disagreement among 
lower courts (e.g., reversals of trial court decisions by an appellate 
court) also enhances the prospects for cert.74  The Supreme Court also 
more frequently reverses than affirms,75 so it is likely that the Court 
 
71.  See Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated 
Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 563 (1999). 
72.  Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin & Daniel Rosen, The 
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111, 
116–17 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963); S. Sidney Ulmer, William Hintze & Louise Kirklosky, 
The Decision to Grant or Deny Certiorari:  Further Consideration of Cue Theory, 6 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 637, 638 (1972). 
73.  LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 100 (3d ed. 1989); Sara C. Benesh, Saul 
Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Aggressive Grants by Affirm-Minded Justices, 30 AM. POL. RES. 
219, 220 (2002); Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United 
States Supreme Court, 51 J. POLITICS 828, 828 (1989); Caldeira et al., supra note 71, at 554.  
See generally John F. Krol & Saul Brenner, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States 
Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335 (1990). 
74.  Tanenhaus et al., supra note 72, at 118. 
75.  Matthew Hall, Experimental Justice: Random Judicial Assignment and the Partisan 
Process of Supreme Court Review, 37 AM. POL. RES. 195, 204 (2009); see also Charles M. 
Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An 
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takes cases that it deems to have been decided incorrectly below.  The 
presence of amicus briefs also increases the likelihood of cert,76 as does 
conflict among courts, both alleged and actual.77  Amici indicate a case 
has importance beyond the parties presenting arguments and that some 
party outside the case will be affected by the Court’s decision.78  And 
cases involving a conflict among courts, especially the circuits, are 
singled out for attention by the Supreme Court in its Rule 10.79  Because 
of the importance of this characteristic, parties often find ways to 
“allege” conflict in order to get the Court’s attention.80  
Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn’s model considers all of the known 
determinants of cert.81  They find that the presence of cues, such as the 
United States as a petitioner or dissent in the lower court, does indeed 
increase the likelihood of cert.82  In addition, a conservative Supreme 
Court is less likely to hear a conservatively decided lower court 
decision.83  When a lower court has been reversed by the intermediate 
 
Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 
102 (2000). 
76.  Caldeira et al., supra note 71, at 563; Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: 
Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 808, 824 (2004); Kevin T. McGuire & Gregory A. Caldeira, 
Research Note, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity:  Agenda Setting in 
the Supreme Court, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 717, 724 (1993); see also Karen O’Connor & Lee 
Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of 
Hakman’s “Folklore,” 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311, 316–17 (1981–1982). 
77.  DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 38–39 (1980); Caldeira et al., supra note 71, at 563. 
78.  Collins, supra note 76, at 810. 
79.  PROVINE, supra note 77, at 37–38; see SUP. CT. R. 10. 
80.  Cameron et al., supra note 75, at 102.  
81.  See Caldeira et al., supra note 71, at 563. 
82.  Id.  Caldeira, Wright and Zorn also find that the Justices employ strategy in their 
voting: When the Court becomes more conservative, liberal Justices are less likely to vote to 
grant, and vice versa, as they predict a loss on the merits.  Id. at 563–64 & n.14.  Their analysis 
considers the individual Justices’ votes as their unit of analysis, however, and we consider the 
decision to grant a case by the Court as a whole.  Id. at 563.  Hence, we are unable to control 
for strategic voting of that sort.  We do control for the direction of the lower court’s decision, 
however, and so consider one piece of the ideological considerations present in the cert 
decision. 
83.  In 1982, under Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court was primarily 
conservative.  Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 
151 (2002).  Using the Martin–Quinn scores as a measure for ideology, for example, a 
majority of the Justices scored conservatively (positive numbers indicate conservative 
decision making and negative numbers vice versa, and most Justices at this time had MQ 
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appellate court, the Justices are more likely to place the case on their 
agenda, and the presence of amici, whether in favor of or against cert, 
increases the likelihood that a petition will be heard by the Court.84  
Finally, conflict, alleged and actual, is a large influence on the Court’s 
decision to grant cert.85 
We consider all of the variables included in the Caldeira, Wright, 
and Zorn article but also add to their work in several ways.  First, we use 
a better measure of conflict.  Using the Blackmun Papers,86 we code 
whether the Justices’ most trusted advisors, law clerks, deem there to be 
a real conflict or not.  Clerks systematically (as mentioned above) 
discussed whether they thought the case presented a real conflict (i.e., a 
split in the circuits) or not in the discussion section.87  If the clerk 
thought a real conflict existed, he or she discussed the split; however, if 
no conflict existed and the petitioner alleged conflict, the clerk 
discredited the split and explained why in his or her discussion section.  
The parties often alleged conflict (they did so in 57% of our cases), but 
those conflicts were not always deemed to be real by the clerk.  This 
advice, then, which is being provided directly by the clerk to the Justices 
themselves, is a superior measure of conflict.88 
 
scores that were positive).  See id. at 145–46, 148.  Thus, we expect this conservative Court to 
be more likely to hear cases in which the most recent lower court decision was liberal. 
84.  Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1122 (1988); McGuire & Caldeira, supra 
note 76, at 724.  In an updated manuscript, Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn find that briefs in 
opposition might not increase the likelihood of cert.  See Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. 
Wright & Christopher Zorn, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme 
Court Revisited 2–3 (July 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109497, archived at http://perma.cc/MC33-K5LN [hereinafter 
Caldeira et al., Organized Interests Revisited].  The authors find that during October Term 
2007 the grant rate for opposition briefs actually decreased.  Id. at 8–9.  It is unclear, then, 
whether briefs in opposition to cert actually hurt the position of those filing in the way that 
Caldeira, Wright and Zorn found them to in their earlier article. 
85.  PROVINE, supra note 77, at 38–39. 
86.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 57. 
87.  See infra Appendix. 
88.  Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn utilized the New York University Supreme Court 
Project to code whether the petitioner alleged conflict, either among lower courts or between 
a lower court and the Supreme Court, or both, and whether an actual, or square, conflict 
existed.  Caldeira et al., supra note 71, at 561; see Introduction to the Appendices, 59 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1403, 1403–04 (1984).  A square conflict existed if the law professors on the project 
determined that two or more courts reached different outcomes on similar cases.  Id. at 1404.  
This measure, while surely solid, is removed from the actual information the Justices have at 
their disposal.  Hence, our measure, focused as it is on the clerks’ actual determination over 
conflict that is communicated to the pool Justices, seems superior. 
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The Court grants cert when its clerks deem the conflict to be real.  
This information, provided to the Justices by their trusted advisors, 
obviously matters.  According to our data, nearly 98% of cases are 
granted cert by the Court when clerks report an actual conflict.  
Allegations of conflict, on the other hand, are not nearly so influential.  
(Only 68% of cases in which only an allegation of conflict is made are 
granted.)  But we want to know more.  It appears to be the case that the 
analysis by the clerks of the extent to which an allegation of conflict is 
real matters.  We also measure some of the other influences on the vote 
to grant cert through the lens of the cert pool memo, interpreted by the 
clerks and passed along to the Justices, and so tap more specifically into 
the information available to and used by the Justices at the time of their 
cert vote. 
For example, Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn find the presence of the 
Solicitor General to matter to the cert decision,89 and many have 
considered why that presence matters.90  Is it a direct influence of the 
Executive Branch on the judiciary?  Or is it instead a trusted attorney 
whose argument carries more weight with the Justices than the 
arguments of other attorneys?  Is it perhaps merely a cue that the case is 
consequential?  Black and Owens suggest that the Solicitor General is 
differentially influential due to the professionalism the office projects.91  
We measure the presence and position of the Solicitor General from the 
memorandum, again allowing us to focus on the extent to which 
information provided by the clerks in the memo matters to the Justices.  
It may well be that the case is supported by the United States, but unless 
the clerk discusses the position of the Solicitor General, we do not treat 
that variable as being present.  So too with briefs amicus curiae.  The 
literature tells us these briefs matter, serving as an indicator to the 
Justices of the pervasive importance of the case under consideration.92  
We code amici from the memos, again providing some measure of the 
content of the memos and their influence.  Only those briefs discussed 
by the clerks are counted.  We can then consider whether the clerk’s 
choice to discuss a certain number of briefs in support of or in 
 
89.  See Caldeira et al., supra note 71, at 563; see also Caldeira et al., Organized Interests 
Revisited, supra note 84, at 5, 12 app. 
90.  See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS (2012); PROVINE, supra note 77, at 86–87. 
91.  BLACK & OWENS, supra note 90, at 136. 
92.  See Collins, supra note 76, at 808. 
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opposition to cert leads the Court to be more or less likely to grant 
cert.93 
One important piece of information provided by the clerks to the 
Justices that we consider is entirely new to the literature: We include 
measures of the identity of the lower court judges involved in 
adjudicating the case in the courts below.  By examining the number of 
“mentions,” by name, of lower court judges in the cert pool memo, we, 
in effect, empirically test Perry’s percolation theory.94  Perry suggests 
that the Supreme Court seeks out “good” and “well-percolated” cases so 
as to have a more informed starting point.95  The Justices seek cases that 
have been reviewed by several other courts because, according to one 
clerk interviewed by Perry, they want to “review how other courts have 
looked at this issue.”96  We consider whether the number of lower court 
judge mentions in a pool memo increases the likelihood the Justices 
vote to grant cert on the theory that the Court wants cases that have 
percolated through the court system.  We expect that, as the number of 
judges mentioned in the pool memos increases, the extent to which the 
case has percolated will be higher and, therefore, that the Justices will 
be more likely to vote to grant cert. 
Taking the judge mention analysis one step further, we also consider 
which judges are being mentioned, testing whether the discussion of 
particularly important lower court judges further enhances the 
likelihood of cert.  Perry suggests not only that the Justices prefer to 
take cases that are well-percolated, but also that they seek well-
reasoned lower court decisions to review.97  And all lower court judges 
are not equally likely to produce high-quality, well-reasoned opinions; 
judges known to and relied upon by the Justices, on average, ought to 
do a better job.  We consider in particular those judges from whom the 
Justices most often receive clerks:  the feeder judges. 
We expect that judges with whom the Justices have ongoing 
relationships will be treated differently when it comes to cert.  We 
consider, therefore, mentions by name of judges who frequently have 
 
93.  It is likely the case that there is a systematic process under way here as well, as the 
clerks focus the Court’s attention on specific amici to the exclusion of others.  We are, in 
other research, attempting to get a handle on that process as well, seeking to ascertain what 
drives the clerks to focus on one brief over another. 
94.  PERRY, supra note 57, at 230. 
95.  Id. at 230–31.  
96.  Id. at 231. 
97.  See id. at 230–34. 
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their clerks promoted to the Supreme Court to ascertain whether the 
Justices are particularly interested in reviewing their work.  Lower court 
judges who can routinely attract quality clerks to work in their chambers 
and then channel those clerks to the Supreme Court will command a 
certain degree of influence with the Justices.  These judges will build a 
reputation for consistently producing “top-notch clerks,”98 and the 
Justices will assume, then, that their opinions are of higher quality.  
Hence, clerk mentions, by name, of particularly successful lower court 
judges (i.e., feeder judges) might increase the likelihood of cert.99  This 
suggests an influence beyond mere percolation, measured as multiple 
treatments of a given issue by multiple judges.  Instead, the Justices 
consider the qualities of the judge being mentioned in a more specific 
way, granting cert to cases considered by judges with whom they have 
more familiarity, likely because they expect those cases to be 
particularly well-reasoned.  Reviewing a well-reasoned case, after all, 
means less work for the Justice charged with writing the opinion.100  
Hence, given the political science research on certiorari, and using 
especially Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn as a baseline, we seek to ascertain 
 
98.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 12, at 83. 
99.  We measure success via Ward and Weiden, who calculate the success of lower court 
judges by the average number of law clerks a judge places on the Supreme Court per term 
(i.e., the number of clerks a judge has placed on the Court divided by a judge’s years of 
service).  Id. at 82.  Only the 26 most successful lower court judges (two district court judges 
and 24 judges from the federal courts of appeals from 1962 to 2002) placing clerks on the 
Supreme Court were coded as “feeder judges.”  Id.  The average number of clerks placed on 
the Court by all 26 lower federal court judges is 1.19 clerks per term, ranging from a 
maximum of 2.73 clerks per term (J. Michael Luttig, 4th Circuit) to a minimum of 0.52 clerks 
per term (Ralph K. Winter, 2nd Circuit).  Id.  For more information regarding the placement 
success rate of law clerks by lower court judges, see id. at 76–85. 
100.  See PERRY, supra note 57, at 230–34.  It is certainly possible that the reverse is 
true: e.g., that the Justices are more likely to “trust” that the lower court judge got it “right” 
when considering a case on which one of these feeder judges has written and hence to be less 
likely to hear the case.  We are more convinced by Perry’s view, especially given what we 
know about the Court’s workload and its shortcuts.  Corley, for example, demonstrates well 
the high degree to which the Justices borrow language from (or plagiarize) the parties’ briefs, 
the lower courts’ decisions, and the amicus briefs filed in the cases.  See Pamela C. Corley, 
Paul M. Collins Jr. & Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion 
Content, 73 J. POLITICS 31, 42 (2011) (on lower court’s decisions); Pamela C. Corley, The 
Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468, 
473 (2008) (on parties’ briefs); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. Corley & Jesse Hamner, The 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content 1, 22 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23
00505, archived at http://perma.cc/4AKS-86DG (on amicus briefs).  Given that propensity and 
the time savings it implies, it seems far more likely than not that the Justices will prefer to 
review well-reasoned decisions written by judges for whom they have respect. 
 2014] LAW CLERKS AS ADVISORS 61 
whether, on top of the known determinants of cert (some of which are 
measured directly from the memoranda and so consist of information 
provided by clerk advisors to the cert pool Justices),101 the additional 
advice and information provided by law clerks in the cert pool 
memorandum influences the decisions made by the Justices.  Focusing 
on the Court as a whole as our unit of analysis,102 and using data we 
collected via the cert pool memoranda available at the Digital Archives 
of the Blackmun Papers,103 we show that both the advice and the 
information matter.  
VIII.  FINDINGS: INFORMATION AND ADVICE 
Table 1 presents the results of our comprehensive models of the 
Court’s certiorari decision.104  Two models are tested there.  Model 1 
considers Perry’s percolation hypothesis, ascertaining whether the 
number of judges mentioned in the cert pool memo enhances the 
 
101.  Eleven control variables used in previous studies on case selection are measured 
here, innovatively, via the pool memo and hence comprise information provided by the clerks 
to the Justices (these include alleged conflict, true conflict, amicus brief(s) discussed, the 
Solicitor General’s position, whether the case involved a constitutional claim, whether the 
lower court was reversed, whether there was dissent in the lower court, and whether the U.S. 
was the petitioner).  See, e.g., Caldeira et al., supra note 71; Collins, supra note 76; O’Connor 
& Epstein, supra note 76.  We also control for the ideological direction of the lower court’s 
decision, as coded by the Spaeth Database (when it is liberal, we expect the conservative 
Rehnquist Court to be more likely to vote to grant cert).  HAROLD SPAETH, LEE EPSTEIN, 
TED RUGER, SARA C. BENESH, JEFFREY SEGAL & ANDREW D. MARTIN, THE SUPREME 
COURT DATABASE CODEBOOK (2014), http://supremecourtdatabase.org/_brickFiles/2014_01
/SCDB_2014_01_codebook.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9RWR-DLYU. 
102.  The literature on certiorari has vacillated between a focus on individual Justice 
votes and the Court’s cert decisions as a whole.  Analyzing the cert decision at both levels is 
useful. 
103.  Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth, with support from the National Science Foundation, 
created and host “The Digital Archive of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun,” freely 
available online.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 57.  We randomly sampled 666 grants and 666 
denials from October Terms 1986–1993 from the archive and coded all information noted as 
coming from the cert pool memos.  (We included, then, deadlisted cases, on which the 
Justices do not explicitly vote to deny cert but no Justice votes to hear.)  In addition, the 
Spaeth Database provided coding for the direction of the lower court for the cases granted 
review, and we applied the same rules to our coding of the lower court’s direction in cases 
denied review.  SPAETH ET AL., supra note 101.  Because the Court obviously hears a tiny 
percentage of the cases appealed to it, we weighted our analysis and used an appropriate 
statistical technique (rare events logistic regression) to control for the rarity of review.  See 
Gary King & Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 137 
(2001).  A copy of a cert pool memo as well as a docket sheet (from which we coded the cert 
vote) are in the Appendix.  See infra Appendix. 
104.  See infra Table 1. 
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likelihood of certiorari in a particular case, under the intuition that such 
mentions constitute evidence that several different courts and judges 
have considered the legal issue presented.  Model 2 considers the 
influence of the feeder judges, testing our claim that mentioning judges 
who are particularly well known to the Justices and expected to produce 
higher-quality opinions enhances the likelihood that the Court will 
desire to review their cases.  In both models, we also consider the 
influence of all of those variables discussed above as having an influence 
on the cert decision, all but one of which are coded from the memos and 
so comprise pieces of information provided by the clerk advisors to the 
Justices.   
As shown in Table 1, many of the known determinants of cert matter 
in the predicted directions, even when measured via their 
communication from the clerks to the Justices in the cert pool memos.105  
Extremely important is the law clerk’s determination that a conflict 
alleged by the parties is real or true.  Given that the memo is almost 
certainly the place the Justices look in order to ascertain the extent to 
which a true conflict exists, this constitutes an important advisor 
influence.106  In addition, the decision by a clerk to discuss in the memo 
specific amici and their arguments influences the Court greatly; one 
brief mentioned increases cert, and two or three briefs mentioned 
increases its likelihood even more.107  Interestingly, discussion by the 
clerk in the memo of briefs in opposition neither increases nor decreases 
the likelihood that the Court will grant cert in the case.  The position 
taken by the Solicitor General—coded as 1 when the memo writer 
mentions that he favors cert, 0 when the clerk does not mention his 
position, and -1 when the clerk discusses his opposition to cert— 
matters strongly, as does what went on in the lower courts.  Discussions 
of disagreement, either among courts or within one court, both 
contribute to the Court’s decision to hear a case, and when the United 
 
105.  See infra Table 1. 
106.  Of course, it could well be that the conflict drives the clerks’ recommendation and 
the Justices’ decision simultaneously.  We explore that possibility in a forthcoming work.  
Zachary Wallander, Sara C. Benesh & David A. Armstrong, Advisors to Elites:  Untangling 
the Causal Mechanism (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  As shown 
there, conflict matters both to the clerks and, through the clerks, to the Justices, but not 
directly to the Justices (there, Justice Blackmun).  Id.  This provides support for the finding, 
here, that the advice of the clerk is what is driving the Court’s decision.  See infra Table 1.  
107.  See infra Table 1. 
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States, as a party, is asking the Court to hear the case directly, the Court 
is extremely receptive.  
Clearly, then, the law clerks matter as advisors to the Court.  That is 
shown via our consideration of the known determinants of cert as 
measured via the cert pool memos.  Importantly, and in addition, 
however, even after controlling for all of those known influences, the 
recommendation of the law clerk to grant, which ends the cert pool 
memo, also increases the likelihood that the Court will grant cert.  This 
means that—even holding conflict, the view of the Solicitor General, 
and all of the other things we know to influence the Supreme Court’s 
docket construction constant—the Court considers the advice in the cert 
pool memo, reacting positively to it.   
In addition to the actual advice of the cert pool memo author, the 
Justices also respond to information about the lower court judges 
involved in the case (and in cases like it, as discussed in the memo).  
Indeed, Table 1 shows that both percolation (multiple judges 
considering the legal issue at stake) and the involvement of the feeder 
judges matter.  As the number of judge mentions increases, the 
likelihood the Court will hear the case also increases, suggesting that the 
Justices respond to clerk discussions of lower court judges and the cases 
in which those judges were involved (including the case at bar).  And, 
beyond percolation, we find the identity of the judges to matter.  As the 
number of feeder judges mentioned in the memo increases, the 
likelihood of the Court hearing the cases also increases.  Judge mentions 
(percolation) and feeder judge mentions have a substantively large 
impact on the Court’s decision, though mentions of feeder judges are 
more influential than mentions of other judges.  Over the range of its 
values (from no judges mentioned to fifteen judges mentioned), the 
probability of a grant increases about 0.039; the Court is 4% more likely 
to grant a case in which many judges were mentioned than one in which 
none were.  Mentioning feeder judges, on the other hand, makes a 
larger difference.  Over the range of that variable (from no feeder 
judges mentioned to ten feeder judge mentions), the likelihood of a 
grant increases by 0.36.  It is clear that the use by the cert pool memo 
author of the names of those judges closest to the Supreme Court leads 
the Court to more carefully consider the cert petition, making it more 
likely that the petition will be heard.  Considering that this analysis 
includes deadlisted cases, it is likely this effect is even stronger than 
what we find here. 
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IX.   CONCLUSIONS: THE LAW CLERK AS ADVISOR 
In this Article, we attempted to ascertain the extent to which 
information provided by law clerks in their cert pool memos influences 
the Supreme Court’s decision making on cert.  Justices, faced with the 
task of sorting the meritorious petitions from the many that are not, 
need advice.  In this Article, we considered exactly which types of advice 
had the potential to influence the Court’s decision making.  Given that 
the institution of the law clerk was explicitly created to ease the Justices’ 
burden, and given that the certiorari stage is the point at which the 
Justices most need assistance, we focus on the law clerk as advisor at 
that stage. 
We find that it is, in fact, the case that the Justices use the advice 
provided to them by the law clerks in the cert pool memos.  Indeed, 
even after controlling for all other known determinants of cert (as 
measured, for the most part, via the cert pool memo), the 
recommendation to grant cert by the memo clerk influences the Court 
to grant a petition.  Clerks are hand-picked by the Justices and are able 
advisors.  It would be odd if the Justices did not consider their clerks’ 
input in their decision making.  And our measurement strategy of 
focusing on the cert pool memo to code the known determinants of cert 
means that what the clerks write matters as well.  When the clerks deem 
a conflict to be real, the Justices are more likely to grant cert.  When 
they discuss the amici and their arguments in the memo, the Court takes 
more notice of the petition.  The clerks learn the types of information 
desired by the Court, and when they provide it in the memos, it matters.  
Indeed, it would be odd if the content of the memos did not matter to 
the Court as well. 
But in an addition to the literature, we find that, just as Perry 
asserted years ago after conducting interviews with Justices and clerks, 
the Justices are, at least in part, driven by the readiness of a case to be 
heard by the Court as well.108  We find, for the first time of which we are 
aware, some empirical evidence that percolation matters to the Court in 
that the Court is more likely to grant cert to a petition for which the cert 
pool memo discusses many lower court judges and the reasoning they 
used in their cases.  In addition, Perry spoke of a desire by the Court to 
consider a case reasoned well below, and our analysis lends empirical 
credence to that supposition as well.109  The more the clerks mention 
 
108.  PERRY, supra note 57, at 230–34. 
109.  See id. 
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feeder judges who reasoned the case or decided similar cases below, the 
more attractive the petition is to the Court, keen as it is on borrowing 
the reasoning of those lower court judges. 
Of course, we need to know more.  It might be the case that the 
Justices obtain information outside the pool memos that we do not 
consider here.  Indeed, it would be unreasonable to think the pool 
memos are the Justices’ only source of information when making a 
decision on cert.  Lawyers and amici provide briefs making arguments 
about whether a case should be granted or denied cert, and we expect 
that the Justices read at least some of them.  However, much of this 
information is summarized in pool memos written by law clerks, and we 
would not expect the Justices to request them unless they were useful. 
In addition, we consider the Court as a whole as the decision maker 
when cert decisions are, in actuality, comprised of individual votes.  A 
focus on those individual votes and a tailoring of the relevant variables 
to the individual Justices (using the recommendation of their clerks, 
considering the lower court judges from whom they take clerks, and 
adding the ideological measures many have found to be important) 
would be a useful extension. 
The Justices of the Supreme Court cannot make decisions alone, nor 
would it be wise for them to do so.  The important and consequential 
decisions they make to grant cert to the tiny percentage of all cases that 
are appealed to them is necessarily limited by time and resource 
constraints.  Thus, they need information and advice to help them 
decide which cases are certworthy.  Law clerks do this directly by giving 
recommendations and information, and the institution of the law clerk 
was designed explicitly with this role in mind.  While some may be 
uncomfortable to find that what the clerks tell the Justices influences the 
Justices’ decision making, we argue that discomfort should only arise 
when the carefully and thoughtfully constructed recommendations made 
by the able law clerk advisor is no longer considered, for that may mean 
that the Justices use some other, less substantively based shortcut like, 
perhaps, an ideological reaction to the lower court’s decision.  Is not law 
clerk influence preferable to that? 
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Table 1 
Supreme Court Decision to Grant Cert, 1986–1993 Terms 
(Grant=1, Deny =0) 
 Model 1 (Percolation) Model 2 (Feeder Judges) 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Sig. 
Level Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Sig. 
Level 
Memo 
Recommendation 
to Grant 
2.21 (0.26) 0.000 2.23 (0.26) 0.000 
Number of Judge 
Mentions 
0.15 (0.08) 0.027 ---- ---- ---- 
Number 
Successful Judge 
Mentions 
---- ---- ---- 0.46 (0.26) 0.039 
Information from the Brief 
Alleged Conflict 0.28 (0.24) 0.124 0.34 (0.24) 0.078 
Actual Conflict 3.48 (0.38) 0.000 3.49 (0.40) 0.000 
One Amicus 
Brief Discussed 
3.85 (0.83) 0.000 3.40 (0.83) 0.000 
Two or Three 
Amicus Briefs 
Discussed 
2.37 (1.00) 0.009 2.39 (0.98) 0.008 
Number of 
Amicus Briefs 
Filed Against 
-0.02 (0.03) 0.460 -0.02 (0.03) 0.628 
Solicitor General 
Position 
1.52 (0.43) 0.000 1.39 (0.40) 0.000 
Constitutional 
Claim 
-0.16 (0.44) 0.719 -0.20 (0.45) 0.653 
Lower Court 
Dissent 
0.96 (0.30) 0.001 1.15 (0.29) 0.000 
Lower Court 1.33 (0.27) 0.000 1.43 (0.26) 0.000 
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All sig. tests are one-tailed. 
 
Model 1 McFadden Pseudo R² (0.56) 
 Expected Proportion Reduction in Error (0.50) 
 
Model 2 McFadden Pseudo R² (0.56) 
 Expected Proportion Reduction in Error (0.50) 
 
 
  
Reversal 
U.S. as Petitioner 3.06 (0.77) 0.000 3.05 (0.77) 0.000 
Other Determinants of Cert 
Lower Court 
Direction 
1.21 (0.23) 0.000 1.14 (0.23) 0.000 
Constant -5.99 (0.21) 0.000 -5.92 (0.21) 0.000 
N 1290  1293  
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APPENDIX: EXAMPLE CERT POOL MEMO 
 
First Page of the Memo 
 
Sections of the Memo 
Section One—Detailed Summary of the Case 
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Section Two—Facts and Proceedings Below 
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Section Three—Contentions Made by Petitioner and Respondent 
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Section Four—Memo Clerk’s Evaluation of the Case 
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Section Five—Recommendation by the Memo Clerk 
 
Blackmun’s Clerk’s Markup of the Memo 
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Docket Sheets 
 
 
